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what they were under the old regime; and
this is, no doubt, true, but the difference
is against, rather than in favor of their
efficiency. The old-fashioned sturdy yeo-
manry of the county, who, forty years
since, made up the panel of petit juries,
in the rural districts, and some of whom
still linger, were a much better material
for jurors than the modem graduates of
the high schools. And these men never
entered upon any new study of the law
in their consultation-rooms. The deci-
sion upon this point was eminently pro-
per. A jury is no more competent to fix
the proper construction of statutes, at
their consultation-rooms, than they are
to determine a nice question of constitu-
tional law. But some of the modem
jurors hold themselves entirely compe-
tent for both. If jury trials continue to
be improved for a few years more, as
they have been of late, by the infusion
of greater intelligence, shown frem the
study of algebra and botany, we think
it may not be difficult to find n majority
in favor of abolishing them. But it 7,7il
in our judgment, be an evil day for the
country, when either grand or petit
juries become too far debased to be
longer endured.
There is another evil in this country
becoming quite too rife for quiet ano
good order, i. e., parties taking the law
in their own hands from an intuitive
knowledge of what it is. The respondent
in this case, from the advice of some
law student, just out of college, or from
reading for himself the history of Kenil-
worth or of Guy of Warwick, appears
to have come to the very sage conclusion,
that as a dwelling-house was the owner's
castle, he might defend it in the same
mode as the barons of the middle ages
did. I. F. R.
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
The payment in money, of part of a debt concededly due, which is
agreed to be taken in full payment, is not an accord and satisfhction.
But when the existence of the debt, or the amount of it is disputed,
and a sum of money less than the amount claimed is received in full
payment, it is an accord and satisfaction: Howard et al. v. Norton, 65
Barb.
So, too, when the note of a third person for less than the debt, or
property other than money is received in sttisfaction of the debt, it is
an accord and satisfaction, and bars a recovery for any part of the rest.
I From J. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 37 Ind. Rep.
R From Edwin B. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 60 Me. Reports.
5 From J. M. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 52 N. H. Rep.
I From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 65 of his Reports.
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due of the debt But when the debtor delivers to his creditor, and the
creditor receives property, at a price agreed upon by them, and the
amount thus paid is less than the debt, it is not an accord and satisfac-
tion, notwithstaLding the creditor agrees to take it as full payment of
the debt : Id.
It is only whcn property is received in satisfaction without any price
beir.g agreed upon, at which it is to be estimated between them, that it
becomes a valid accord and satisfaction : Id.
Where sheep, delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff and others
of his creditors, in part payment of 20 per cent. of the amount of their
resp'3ctive debts, were received at $5 per head; it was held that this
operated only as the payment of so much money, and being less than
the debt, was not an accord and satisfaction: Id.
ASSUMPSIT. See Vendor.
ATTACHMENT.
Of bulky, Artlees-Afanual Possession.-An officer, having a writ of
attachment against A., went to the barn where some hay was stored, and
there posted a paper, written thus: 11I have attached all the hay in this
barn, in which [A.] has any interest." A. knew at the time, and the
plaintiff soon after, and prior to his subsequent purchase of the hay of
A., of the posting of this notice and its contents. The officer made re-
turn upon the writ, to the effect that he had "attached all the * * *
hay * * * in the town of W., in which the said A. has any right, title,
interest., or estate; and on the same day left at the office of the town
clerk of said town a true and attested copy of this writ, and of this my
return endorsed thereon." Held, that these proceedings did not consti-
tute a valid lien upon the property, as against the plaintiff: Bryiant v.
Osgood, 52 N. H.
The statute, which provides that an attachment of bulky and ponder.
ous articles shall not be defeated or dissolved by any neglect of the officer
to retain actual possession thereof, provided he leave an attested copy of
the writ, and of his return of such attachment thereon, as in the attach-
ment of real estate (Gen. Stats., chap. 205, § 16), requires that the re-
turn should be so certain and explicit in its description of the property
and its situation, as to give to subsequent attaching creditors or pur-
chasers substantially the same notice they would derive from knowledge
of the actual retention of possession of the property by the officer :" Id.
CnrTIORAuI.
Allowance and Dismission.-The common law writ of certiorari is
allowed, and the remedy sought by it granted, in the discretion of the
court; and where, after a return is made to such writ, the court is sat-
isfied, upon a hearing, that the writ improvidently issued, or that jus-
tice and equity, or a regard to considerations of public policy or public
inconvenience require such a decision in respect to it, it will dismiss
the writ, without passing upon the merits, upon the particular questions
raised, or designed to be raised by it for review: The People ex rel.
Curtis v. The ommon, Council of the City of Utica, 65 Barb.
What adjudications may be reviewed by it.-The common council
of a city passed the initiatory resolutions required by the charter of the
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city for the publication of notice of an intended improvement in a
street; and such notice was duly published, with a notice that, on a day
named, final action would be had upon the application, and sealed pro-
posals for the work received and considered. On the day named, vari-
ous proposals were received and opened, and the common council, by
resolution, determined that a certain proposal was reasonable and favor-
able, and on a subsequent day passed an ordinance accepting and ap-
proving of said proposal, and directing the work to be done, according
to the plans and specifications. Held, that this was such a final adju-
dication as would warrant the allowance and retention of a writ of cer-
tiorari to review the same: Id.
Within what time to be applied for-Laches.-Where upwards of two
years have elapsed since the first proceedings for paving a street were
initiated, and nearly two years since the final ordinance for the con-
struction of the work, and the acceptance of proposals therefor ; and a
superintendent of the work had been appointed, on the petition of the
relator and others; and the work had been completed, and an assess-
ment for the expense thereof duly made and confirmed, and the assess-
ment-roll delivered to the city treasurer for collection, and more than
one-half the amount of the assessment paid ; it was held, that a writ of
certiorari to review the proceedings of the common council in respect
to such improvements ought not to be entertained: Id.
Estoppel.-Held, also, that the relator and others, in whose behalf
the writ was sued out, having stood by and seen the work constructed, for
the benefit of their property, should be estopped from questioning the
right of the city to make such improvement - Id.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
A chattel mortgage was given, upon a stook of goods in a store, worth
$8000, to secure a debt evidenced by the mortgagor's promissory notes
for $1400. It contained a provision that it should be a continuing
lien and security upon stock or goods to be thereafter brought into the
store, said property then being and remainig in the possession of the
mortgagor; provided always, that the mortgagor should pay to the
mortgagee $1400, the amount of said notes, with interest, as provided
therein ; with the right to enter into said store and take possession of
the property, on the non-payment of said notes, or.in case the mortga-
gees should, at any time, deem themselves unsafe, and sell the same fbr
said debt. hfeld, that such mortgage was clearly fraudulent, as against
.•reditors, upon its face and the undisputed facts of the case : Yates v.
Obsted, Adn'r, &c., 65 Barb.
Held, also, that a fair interpretation of the mortgage itself implied or
involved an agrcement and understanding between the parties that the
mortgagor should go on with the store, selling the goods on his own ac-
count, and replenishing the stock from time to time, precisely as he had
previously done, and without respect to the mortgage, till the notes, or
)ne of them, which the mortgage was given to secure, should fall due:
Td.
Hcld ftrther, that the provision that the mortgage should be a con-
tinning lien and security upon " the stock of goods to be thereafter
brought into the store," imported that the new goods were expected to
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be brought into the store to replace those sold, so that the lien should
be continued and transferred from those sold to the new goods thereafter
to be brought into the store; and the lien was thus a lien fluctuating
from old goods as sold, to new goods substituted in their place. That
this was the clear purpose and intent of the parties, is fairly inferrible
from the terms of the mortgage itself.
Under such circumstances, although no express agreement, in words,
between the parties, that the mortgagor shall continue to sell the goods
mortgaged, and the business proceed as before the giving of the mort-
gage, is found by the referee, such an agreement or understanding may
be implied: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Evidence-Admissios.-Whether the court below was right or wrong
in allowing questions to be put to the prisoner and others on the trial,
with the view of impeaching his testimony-what the prisoner said, at
any time after the commission of the offence, is competent against him
as admissions; and these admissions can be proved by himself, or any
other person who knew of them: Fralic v. The People, 65 Barb.
.Prisoner a Witness in his own behaf- Contradicting him.-When a
prisoner, on the trial, takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf, he
is subject to the same rules of examination, and to be contradicted, as
any other witness : Id.
It is therefore competent to show that his testimony as to being un-
conscious of what he did, while committing the crime, and for some time
afterwards, was not true. It could not be true, if, very soon thereafter,
he related to the witness the manner in which the crime was com-
mitted : Id.
Judge's Charge.-The counsel of a prisoner cannot be heard to assail
the charge of the court, upon the trial, when he has not excepted to it,
or the exception is too general to be available : Id.
Provocation-Reducing grade of Crime.-Whether or not mere
words, uttered in the hearing of a person who, by reason thereof, kills
another, can be permitted to reduce the killing from murder to man-
slaughter, it is clear that information communicated by others to the
person who kills another because of it, can never be permitted to reduce
the grade of the crime : Id.
Motion for _New Trial, for newly-discovered Evidence.-Upon a writ
of error, the court has no power to hear a motion for a new trial upon
the ground that, since the trial, material evidence, favorable to the pri-
soner, has been discovered : d.
If such a motion can be made in any court, it must be made in the
Oyer and Terminer. It cannot be made, in the first instance, at the
general term : Id.
DAMAGES. See Trespass.
Penalty-Liuidated Damages.-As a general rule, a sum of money
in gross, stipulated to be paid for the non-performance of an agreement,
is considered as a penalty or security for the payment of such damages
as the party in whose favor the stipulation is made may have sustained
from the breach of contract by the opposite party. It will be incum-
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bent on the party who claims to recover the sum as liquidated damages
to show that they were so considered and intended by the contracting
parties: Davis v. Gillett, 52 N. H.
A. by his bond, acknowledged himself to be " holden and firmly bound"
to B. " in the sum of one thousand dollars." The condition of the bond
was that A. should not engage in a specified i business within a certain
time and place. In the absence of any evidence concerning the inten-
tion of the parties, it was held that the sum of one thousand dollars was
to be regarded as a penalty, and not as liquidated damages: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See hattel Mortgage; Fraud; Fraudulent
Conveyance.
Where the defendants, at the time of making a fraudulent transfer
of their property, had in their possession a 5-20 U. S. bond for $1000,
belonging to the plaintiff, which they afterwards converted to their own
use: HelN, that although the plaintiff was not, at the time of making
the conveyance, a creditor, in the ordinary meaning of that term, yet
she was equitably entitled to protection against the fraudulent transfer,
to the same extent as if she had then held a debt for $1000 against the
defendants: Pendleton v. Hughes, 65 Barb.
DEED.
Where a deed executed by H. and wife, to M., was put into the hands
of a third person, with directions to obtain a deed from M. to H.'s wife,
and was delivered upon that condition, and M. retained the same, and
refused to execute a deed to H.'s wife; Held that the deed to M. never
became operative, by reason of the non-performance of the condition
on which it was delivered: Pendleton v. Hughes, 65 Barb.
EASEMENT.
Release by Administrator.-A voluntary release of an easement by an
administrator does not bind the estate nor the heirs of an intestate:
Mowe v. Stevens, 60 Me.
ESCAPE.
JTudgment against Sherf-Recapture.-Where a defendant in a bas-
tardy suit is imprisoned for a failure to pay or replevy a judgment ren-
dered against him in such suit, and escapes without the consent of the
sheriff, and is not recaptured for three months thereafter, and judgment
is recovered against the sheriff, on his bond, for the escape, by the rela-
trix in the original suit, and the judgment is not paid, the defendant
cannot be recaptured and imprisoned: Exparte Voltz, 37 Ind.
EVIDENCE. See Receipt.
Parol inadnissible to vary subsepqent written; or to contradict state-
ment of collateral fact drawn fromr Witness on cross-examination -Evi-
dence that the defendant contracted with another person to do t6,e same
work to recover pay for which plaintiff sues, is no defence : Bell v.
Woodman, 60 Me.
In a suit between persons not party to a written contract it cannot
be varied by parol testimony of a different oral agreement previously
made; for such agreement is merged in the writing: Id.
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If the statement of a fact collateral to the issue be drawn from a
witness upon cross-examination, the party eliciting the testimony cannot
contradict it: Id.
Written Contract-Attempt to change by Parol.-Where an ordex
was given upon A. to pay certain claims out of the proceeds of a cer.
tain note in his hands, and he accepted the same in writing, "so soon
as the maker pays the note," and A. afterward obtained a judgment and
foreclosure of a mortgage given to secure the note held by him, and
bought in the mortgaged property, and was subsequently offered more
than the sum due upon the note for the property : Held, that he could
not defend against the payment of the claims included in the order
accepted by him, on the ground that the person who gave the order was,
at the time when A. accepted the same, indebted to A. for more than
the amount at which he had bid in the land, and that it was understood
by the person for whose benefit he accepted the order that this indebt-
edness was to be first paid, and that it is not yet discharged : Miller,
"r'r, v. Goldthwait, Adm'r, 37 Ind.
Contract of S ervice-Failure of Performance by Servant.-In an
action to recover for work and labor, the plaintiff claimed that, by the
original contract of hiring, he was to work "so long, and so long only,
as he chose." The defendants claimed that the hiring was for a speci-
fied time; and it appeared that the suit was commenced before the
expiration of that time.- Held, that evidence to show the extent of
damage occasioned the defendants by the plaintiffs' leaving their em-
ploy before the expiration of the term of service claimed by them was
properly excluded: Blodgett v. Berlin Mills Co., 52 N. H.
A breach or failure of performance by the employee of the original
contract of hiring may be shown by the employer in defence, pro tanto,
to an action against him for the wages, under the general issue: Id.
Improper Receipt of-New Trial.-The plaintiff called the defendant
as witness-in-chief. Then, to affect his credit and to impeach him, under
sect. 15, ch. 209, General Statutes, and sect. 1 of ch. 38 of the Laws
of 1871, a record from the municipal court of Boston, Mass., was intro-
duced and admitted to show that the defendant had there been convicted
of larceny; but the record was not properly authenticated, to make it
admissible as evidence. After verdict for the plaintiff: Held, that the
verdict should not be set aside, if the proper evidence of authentication
of the record used on the trial is furnished to the court; and when thus
furnished, that being the only ground of exception, judgment will be
rendered on the verdict: Hutchins v.' Gerrish, 52 N. H.
FORMER RECOvERY. 'See Partnership.
FRAUD. See Vendor.
Judgment without Relief.-Where judgment-creditors sue to recover
of the defendant the value of property fraudulently sold to him by the
judgment-debtor, to defeat their claims, judgment in their favor cannot
be rendered without relief from valuation or appraisement laws : White-
hall v. Crawford et al., 37 Ind.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OP.
Parol Promise to answer for Debt of another.-G. held a note
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against S., and J. held a note and mortgage against G., and it was
agreed between J. and H. that J. was to surrender to G. the note and
mortgage, and release him from that indebtedness, and take from him
an assignment of the note which he held acainst S., and H. agreed by
parol to pay to J. the latter note. J. accordingly did release the note
and mortgage against G. and took an assignment from G. of the note
against S. Held, that the contract was within the Statute of Frauds,
which requires a special promise to answer for the debt of another to
be in writing, in order that an action may be maintained thereon:
Crosby et al. v. Jeroloman, 37 Ind.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
A conveyance, voluntary, and without consideration, of land, was
executed by H. and his wife, when he was in embarrassed circumstances,
and shortly before his failure, to his wife's mother, with the understand-
ing and upon the condition that the premises should be conveyed back
to H.'s wife. Held, that without reference to the conduct of the
grantee, the deed was fraudulent and void, by reason of the conduct of
the grantors alone: Pendleton v. Hughes, 65 Barb.
Where the direct effect of a conveyance, and of omitting to put the
same on record, is to defraud a creditor of the grantor, who relying on
the grantor's apparent ownership of land, has entrusted property to him
or his firm, and the same has been embezzled and appropriated, such
conveyance will be held fraudulent and void as to the creditor : Id.
And this, whether the creditor occupied the position of a creditor
before, or not until after, the execution of the fraudulent conveyance.
In either case he is entitled to relief by a judgment declaring the con-
veyance fraudulent and void, and that it be cancelled of record, &c. : Id.
HiGHWAY.
What is defect in is for the Jur y-Wife as Witness.-Whether a
cellar along the line of a public street, unprotected by a suitable barrier,
constitutes a defect, is a question for the jury in an action against a
city to recover damages for an injury caused: by such defect; and this,
although the cellar is not in the general direction of travel, and
although the plaintiff was not travelling along the street, but was cross-
ing it, and intended to pass from the street into a lane (where he had a
right to go), but mistook its locality in a dark night, and fell into the
cellar: Stack v. -Portsmouth, 52 N. H.
The admission of the plaintiff's wife to testify to his physical condi-
tion after an injury, and to his statements, when alone with her, of
suffering pain, involves no violation of marital confidence: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIPE. See Highway.
JUDGMENT. See Fraud; Record.
Entry of ntunc pro tunc.-After verdict for the plaintiff, the 2ase
was transferred to the law term for the consideration of the full bench,
upon exceptions taken by the defendant. While the cause was thus
pending in the law term, the defendant died. Afterward, the defend-
ant's exceptions being overruled, it was held, that the plaintiff should
have judgment as of the term when the verdict was rendered: Blais-
dell v. Harris, 52 N. H.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
JURY.
VaZue-Eidene-Finding.-A jury need not fix the value of per-
sonal property at the exact sum testified to by any one witness or by
any two,.but may find an intermediate sum: Jeffersonville, &c., Rail-
road Co. v. Tll, 37 Ind.
MARRIED WOMEN.
Liability upon Contracts.-A married woman is not liable upon any
executory contract, unless it be made in connection with her separate
business or separate estate. Hence a bond executed by her is of no
validity where it is not alleged that she carries on any separate business,
nor that it was given for or on account of her separate estate: Kidd et
al. v. Conway, 65 Barb.
But although a bond accompanying a mortgage is void, it does not
follow that the mortgage also is void. The latter recites a consideration,
and is under seal. There is therefore a sufficient consideration to sup-
port it: Id.
A statement in a mortgage executed by a married woman, that the
mortgaged premises are occupied by her as a dwelling-house, and that
the mortgage is intended to cover all the lands and buildings in con-
nection therewith, is a distinct allegation or admission that the premises
are her separate estate: Id.
Where a married woman gives a mortgage on real estate, the court
must assume that it is her separate property until the contrary appears;
and it seems that she will be estopped from denying that it was such: Id.
If a charge upon the separate estate of a married woman, contained
in her endorsement of a promissory note, is valid, as was held in The
Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613, a charge created
by her mortgage is equally valid: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Evidence; Railroad.
A servant cannot recover from his employer for injuries resulting from
the unskilfulness of his fellow-servants, if he has the same knowledge,
or means of knowledge, of such unskilfulness, that the employer has:
Baskin, Adm'nr, v. The N. Y. Central, &c., Railroad Co., 65 Barb. <"
M ECHANiCS' LIEN.
Necessary Parties-Priority over Conveyances.-In a suit to enforce
a mechanics' lien for the material furnished and labor performed in the
erection of a building, where, subsequent to the contract for the work,
the owner of the land has sold and conveyed it, he is not a necessary
party.: KellUenberger v. .Boyer et al., 37 Ind.
The lien of the mechanic relates to the time when the work com-
menced or the material began to be furnished, and takes priority as
well over subsequent conveyances as over subsequent encumbrances: Id
NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad.
Liability of Owner for acts of Contractor.-The defendant and
others, a committee of the town of Keene, to make improvements in
and about a certain pond for the purpose of supplying the citizens of
Keene with water, found it necessary to clear off a strip of land about
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the margin of said pond, which land the town of Keene had purchased
for that purpose; and the committee had let to one Nourse the job of
so clearing this land at a stipulated price, Nourse prepared the land
for burning, and set fire to the brush and logs upon this land, which
escaped, as was alleged, through the carelessness and negligence of
Nourse, to the plaintiff's land, and consumed his wood, timber and
fences. Held, that the defendant would not be liable for the negligence
or carelessness of Nourse by virtue of any relation between the defend-
ant as committee of the town, and Nourse as a contractor or sub-con-
tractor, who bad the entire management and control of the clearing of
the land, according to his contract: Wright v. Holbrook, 52 N. H.
Whether the town of Keene, as owner of the land which Nourse was
clearing, could, under the circumstances, be heid liable for the careless-
ness or negligence of Nourse, qunere? Id.
Steam essels-Excessive *pressure on .Boiler.-Even if a pressure
upon a steam boiler in excess of the amount allowed by the govern-
ment inspectors, by their certificate, to be used, is not legal negligence
under the Act of Congress of February 28th, 1871, for the better secu-
rity of life on board of steam vessels; yet,lin an action in a state court,
for damages, at common law, the court, or a referee, may properly hold
that it is evidence of negligence, and sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding of negligence in fact : Carroll v. 'The Staten Island Railroad
Company, 65 Barb.
Concurrent-Proof of- Contributory Negligence of Third Person.-
In an action to recover damages for an injury, resulting from the neg-
ligence of the defendant, the rule as to the burden of proof of concur-
ring negligence on the part of the plaintiff is, that the plaintiff must
satisfy the jury, in order to entitle him to recover, that he was not
guilty of negligence which contributed to produce the injury; but lie
is not called on to make such proof in the first instance, unless the cir-
cumstances disclosed by his own witnesses tend to show him guilty of
negligence. Where negligence is not thus established it is to 1,e affirm-
atively proved by the defendant: Robinson v. The X. Y Cnt,'al, &c.,
Railroad Co., 65 Barb.
The rule is the same in cases of negligence as in other cases. If the
plaintiff's own evidence establishes a defence, the plaintiff, before be
rests, must rebut it, or he will be nonsuited : Id.
Contributory negligence is matter of defence, and is not to be affirma-
tively disproved in order to entitle the injured party to recover: .'l.
A person who is injured by the negligence or another, is not respon-
sible for any contributory negligence of a third person with whom he
happens to be riding at the time, over whom or whose conduct lie has
no control: Id.
Where in an action for negligence the charge was, not that the jury
must be satisfied, in order to find a verdict for the plaintiff, that she was
not chargeable with coucurring negligence, which they might do from the
absence of any evidence tending to prove it ; but was, that negligence
must. be affirmati'ely disproved by the plaintiff: I_5 Ul, that the charge was
erroneous; the jury, by the language used, being given to understand
that they must find for the defendant, unless the plaintiff, by evidence
on her own part, disproved or rebutted negligence which was otherwise
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imputable to her, or, what was the same thing, presumed against her:
Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Unincorporated Company.
Contract-Joint-,Several-Former Recovery.-Where a mortgage
executed by one of the members of a partnership in his own name, but
for the firm, and upon property held in his own name, but in trust for
the firm, contained this agreement: "He assuming the payment of said
notes, and they being for the purchase-money for the above-described
real estate, and the mortgagor expressly agrees to pay the sum of money
above described," the notes referred to having been given by another
person, and the partnership having purchased an interest in the real
estate, and thus assumed their payment. Hed, that the contract was
the joint contract only of all the partners, and not the several contract
of each: Crosby v. Jeroloman, 37 Ind.
Where suit had been brought upon the notes and mortgage against
the maker of the notes and the member of the firm in whose individual
name the mortgage was executed, and judgment only of foreclosure
taken against the member of the firm, and a personal judgment against
the maker of the notes. Held, that, as judgment on the agreement to
pay the notes might have been taken against the partner in that action,
the proceedings and judgment taken were a bar to any further suit
against him on the contract, and therefore a bar to any suit against his
partners, who were only liable jointly with him: Id.
Assumption by incoming Partner of out-going Partner's share of Debts.
-Where one purchases the interest of one of the partners in a firm, and
takes his place therein, not agreeing to pay at once all the debts of the
firm, but only that he will "assume" the share of the liabilities of the
firm which belong to the out-going partner, the intent and meaning of
such assumption is to indemnify the out-going partner. If the latter is
obliged to pay any of the old debts, under such circumstances, then and
then only he is entitled to maintain his action : Coleman v. Lanning et
al., 65 Barb.
Application of Payments.-At the time of the purchase by the defend-
ants of an interest in a partnership firm, there was a ba~anee of $200
due from the firm to R. The account was kept along with the new firm,
and was one continuous account; and payments were made to R. more
than sufficient to extinguish such balance of $200, without any specific
appropriation by either party, other than such as arose from the charges
and credits in the continuous account and* the appropriation thereof
assumed by the rules of law. Held, that the rule, in such a case, is
that the payments are to be applied to the earliest items in the account)
although the payments are made by the new firm, some of whorn are not
liable to the creditor for the debt extinguished by their application, and
that this is especially so, where the ineoming partner has assumed his
share of the old liabilities : ld.
PLEADING.
Jurisdiction.-If a court has no jurisdiction, there is no trial, and
the Supreme Court will not look to the record to see whether the merits
of the cause were fairly tried: Loeb v. Mathlis, 37 Ind.
Under section 54 of the code (2 G. & H. 81) an objection to the
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jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the action is not
waived by failing to demur or answer. Such objection may be raised
on a motion in arrest of judgment: Id.
RAILROAD.
Duty in regard to improvements in Machinery, &c.-It is the duty of
railroad companies to use upon their trains, all improvements in ma-
chinery, or in the construction of cars, &c., commonly used by other com-
panies ; and it is negligence if they do not use them, for which they are
liable to a person injured, if the improvement would in any appreciable
degree have contributed to prevent the injury : Costello v. The Syra-
euse, Binghamton, &c., Railroad Companzy, 65 Barb.
Railroad companies are bound to supply their trains with brakes, and
if a person is injured on, or while crossing a track, and the injury could
have been avoided by the use of brakes, the omission to have them, or tc
use them, would be such negligence as would render them liable to the
person injured : I1.
If they are obliged to have some brake the public safety requires
that it should be the best in use. They cannot use an old brake which
will not stop a train in less than 1000 feet, when running ten miles per
hour, when other companies use brakes that will stop a train in 500
feet, running at the same rate of speed : Ia.
A railroad company is as much bound to prevent doing injury to a
person on its track, by using all the facilities that experience has pro-
vided for the purpose, as the person on the track is bound to use all the
means in his power to escape the injury, when he is aware that it is
impending: Id.
Rate of speed through Cities, &c.-It seems to be no more than rea-
sonable to require railroad companies to run their trains through cities
and villages at such moderate rate of speed as that, by the use of brakes
a train may be speedily stopped, so that neither person nor property
shall be exposed to injury from it; and this without regard to whether
or not there is a municipal regulation as to the speed at which trains
shall be run.-Per MULLIN, P. J. : Id.
Contributor2, .eglgence.-A charge to ithe jury that a child that is
suijuris is bound to exercise the same degree of caution, in approaching
and crossing a railroad track, to prevent injury from an approaching
train, that an adult is bound to exercise, is erroneous, and being so, the
jury may, upon the evidence, find that a child seven years of age,
injured while attempting to cross a railroad track, is not chargeable with
negligence that contributed to produce the injury: Id.
.Zeglgence.-In an action against a railroad company, brought by the
administrator of one of its employees, to recover damages for the neg-
ligent killing of the deceased by the cars of the defendant, it is unne-
cessary to consider the question whether the persons employed on the
train that hilled the deceased were guilty of negligence that caused his
death. The sole question is, was the defendant guilty of negligence in
employing an incompetent person as conductor on such train, or in not
prescribing rules which would apply to trains moving where such train
was, and provide for warnings to persons passing, or being on or near
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the track when such train was moved: Haskin, Adm'r. v. The M Y
Central, &c., Railroad Co., 65 Barb.
Raising to the post of conductor a person who has served seven years
in the inferior stations of car-coupler and shover, the duties of which
places made him acquainted with the modes of making up trains, the
dangers incurred by those employed in the work, and by others, when
the trains are in motion, and the precautions necessary to guard against
accidents, is not of itself negligence; where it does not appear that he
had ever shown himself to be incompetent, or unfaithful, prior to the
happening of the injury sued for. Id.
Corporations, as well as individuals must be at liberty to raise men
from lower to higher places; and such elevation of them cannot be im-
puted to the employers as negligence, unless the places from which they
are raised are not such as to properly prepare them for the higher. Id.
It being utterly impossible for a railroad company to move its trains,
when being made up, according to a time-table, the omission to provide
regulations for the movement of trains engaged in and about the freight
and engine-houses and depots of the company is hot negligence: ld.
But it is practicable to prescribe in what manner engineers and con-
ductors shall give notice of the approach of an engine, with or without
cars, when trains are being made. up, or moving about freight-houses,
depots, or engine-houses. And if proper precautions are not taken for
the protection of life and limb from injury by such engineers and
trains, a person injured, who is not an employee of the company, has
just cause of complaint, and is entitled to recover damages for any in-
jury sustained by reason of the omission of the company to adopt all
reasonable guards against liability to injury : Id.
One, however, who enters into the employ of such company, with full
knowledge that no provision has been made for protecting its servants
against injury from moving trains or engines, has no claim to recover
damages if he sustains an injury by reason of the company omitting to
make such provisions and regulations as prudence, and a proper regard
for the lives of others, might require: Id.
REAL ESTATE.
Possession of Land.-Where one has a right to use land for certain
purposes his occupation of it must be presumed, primO facie, to be in
accordance with his legal right: Mowe v. Stevens, 60 Ale.
RECEIPT.
Where explainable.-A receipt for money, though it be stated to be
in full of the debt or demand upod which it is received, may be contra-
dicted or explained by parol evidence: Howard et al. v. Norton, 65
Barb.
A receipt for the note of a third person is explainable, unless it be
stated in it, that it is received in full payment of the debt or demand
on which it is to be applied : Id.
A receipt was given by the plaintiff in these words: "Rec'd. of L.
H. $167.40 in payment of an ace. of $837, against J. B. Al. & Co., for
apples bought by J. S." Held, that considering this as a mere receipt
for a given sum of money in full of the plaintiff's debt, it was explain-
able, unless it was to be treated on the evidence as an accord and satis-
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faction. But that if it was to be considered an accord and satisfactiol
it could not be explained or contradicted by parol evidence : Id.
RECORDS.
Of Judgments-How amended.-The clerk of a court has, ez officio,
no right, without the express order of the court to that effect, to com.
plete, alter, or amend the record kept by a predecessor in that office,
whose term has expired : Rockland Water Co. v. Pillsbury, 60 Me.
If there be a failure to make record of a judgment, the party claim-
ing to have it recorded should present a petition to the court to have this
done, and give due notice to the adverse party : Id.
REFEREE.
.Power to sell Real Estate- Title of Parchlaser.-When, in an action
brought by a judgment-creditor, to set aside a conveyance made by his
debtor, as fraudulent against creditors, the deed is declared fraudulent and
void, and a referee is appointed, and ordered to sell the premises; who sells
the same at public auction, and executes a deed thereof to the purchaser,
no title will pass thereby ; by reason of a total want of power in the
court to authorize the referee to sell ; but the title will remain in the
grantee in the fraudulent conveyance, and pass by his deed : Dawley v.
Brown, 65 Barb.
SALE. See Vendor,
Passing of Title.-The trustee purchased of the defendant a hog which
he took into his possession, some sugar which he mixed with his sugar,
and other articles, the prices of all which were agreed upon. and took
out his wallet to pay for them, but the writ was served upon him before
he could deliver the money, and he did not deliver it; whereupon the
defendant reclaimed the property. Held, that this was a sale for cash,
and that the title did not pass until payment. and so no debt was created,
and (the articles being exempt from attachment) the trustee was dis-
charged : Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H.
STREAM.
Dedication of Way- Way terminating on .aviqgable Stream pre. ioned
to eaqend to Low-water .fark-Damages. -Where riparian proprietors
have laid out and sold their land in lots as delineated upon a plan, hav-
ing streets thereon terminating upon a navigable stream, such streets
will be considered as dedicated to the use of purchasers of such lots. and
of the public, down to the water at all stages of the tide, unless there
be some express reservation of the flats ; although the lines, upon such
plan, indicating the boundary of the tier of lots nearest the river be
drawn at high-water mark : Stetson v. Bangor, 60 Me.
The conversion of a way dedicated to the use of the purchasers of
adjoining lots into a public way does not authorize the award of more
than nominal damages: Id.
SUNDAY.
An action against carriers of passengers, to recover damages for an
injury sustained by a passenger through their negligence, being brought
for the violation of a plain duty on the part of the defendants, to trans-
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port the plaintiff with care and in safety, it is no defence thereto that
the accident causing the injury occurred on Sunday, when the plaintiff
was not travelling fbr any of the purposes allowed by the act for the
observance of the Sabbath: Carroll v. The Staten Island Railroad C£om-
pany, 65 Barb.
If the obligations of the defendants, and the rights of the plaintiff,
in such a case, rest on contract, the fact that the contract for the trans-
portation of the plaintiff was made on Sunday will not exempt the
carriers from liability for damages occasioned by their negligence : Id.
SURETY.
Official Bond-Powers of Selectmen-Their neglect no discharge of
Sureties on Treasurer's Bond.-The failure of the selectmen to examine
the accounts of a town treasurer, as directed by Rev. Sts., oh. 6, § 152,
will not affect the liability of the sureties upon his bond : Farmington v.
Stanley, 60 Me.
Nor will surety be released if the selectmen, failing to detect an error
in addition, certify the treasurer's account to be correct, when, in fact,
there is a deficit; even if this certificate be made known to the surety
soon after its entry upon the treasurer's books and while the treasurer
has attachable assets enough to cover the deficit, though he subsequently
die insolvent: Id.
TowN.
Charter of Incororation does not give T'tl,. to Land-vidence of
Title by Votes.-Where land and the franchises of a town containing it
were granted to the same persons by the same charter, this was held to
vest no title to the land in the town as a municipal body: South Hamp-
ton v. Fowler, 52 N. H.
A town acquires no title, by virtue of its act of incorporation, to land
within its limits not before granted: Id.
If the title to lands in Hampton not granted to individuals was in
the town, and a new town was formed within its limits containing the
land, the title still remained in Hampton; affirming the doctrine of
Union Baptist Soc. v. Candia, 2 N. H. 20 : Id.
Votes of a town in possession of land, showing a claim of title, are
admissible, as giving a character to its possession ; but where there is
no evidence of possession, they are inadmissible: Id.
Records of a town which holds land as a private corporation, unless
accompanied by possession, are not admissible, even against a stranger,
to prove that the town claimed the title: Id.
TRESPASS.
Lawful Entry-Abuse of Authority.-The plaintiff had been post
master, and had kept the post-office in a room set apart for that purpose,
in his own dwelling-house. The defendant, acting as the servant and
assistant of a newly-appointed postmaster, entered the office so kept by
the plaintiff, ufider orders from his principal, to remove the furniture
and fixtures, &c., belonging to the government, to the new office. Held,
that such entry being, by authority of law, an abuse of the authority,
as by committing an assault and battery on the plaintiff and his wife,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
might have the effect to make the original entry wrongful, and the de.
fendant a trespasser ab btitio : Sterling v. Warden, 52 N. H.
Damages.-Where a complaint for trespass upon real estate avers a
consequential injury to personal property, such averment will be taken
only as a matter of aggravation of the damages : Loeb et al. v. Mathis.
37 Ind.
TROVER.
Damages-Effect of Verdict.-In an action of trover by a payer
against a payee for the conversion of a note for thirty-five dollars. the
plaintiff recovered a judgment for one cent damages and costs, which
was satisfied by the defendant. Held, that this did not entitle the
defendant to enforce the collection of the note as a valid outstanding
obligation against the payor: Dearth v. ,Spencer, 52 N. H
TausT.
Discharge of-How enforced by Cestui que trust, usig n2ame of Trustee.
-If a cestid que trust be induced by fraud to discharge the trust, it
must be considered as extinguished so far as an innocent purchaser of
the trust-property, who buys, relying upon the discharge, is concerned:
Penobscot Railroad Co. v. Mayo, 60 Me.
But if a person whose own note is deposited in trust for others, among
whom its proceeds are to be divided, obtain possession of it without the
consent of the cestui que trust, an action for money had and received
brought against him, in the name of the depositary, by and for the
benefit of one of those entitled to a share of the amount due on the note,
is maintainable; nor can the suit be discontinued by the nominal plain-
tiff or his assignee, without the consent of the party in interest : Id.
IUNINCORPORATED COMPANY.
Wo are .1fembers-their Liability.- very member of an unincorpo-
rated joint-stock company is personally liable for all of its debts : Frost
v. Walker, 60 Me.
It is sufficient to authorize a finding that persons are members of such
company, if it be proved that their names are found upon the subscrip-
tion-papers for its capital stock, and that they paid. withcut objection,
assessuments for the number of shares set against their respective names,
even if it be not shown by whom their names were so subscribed : Id.
By thus contributing to the working capital, the subscribers became
entitled to share in the profits of the company, and liable, as copartuers,
for its debts : 1I.
It seems that there is no distinction, in respect to this liability, between
a subscriber for stock and a stockholder; however this may be, an actual
payment of assessments upon shares subscribed for will create such lia-
bility : Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Rescission of C(ontrat-F-r-aud-.Assrp,sit to recover part pail.-
When a party seeks to rescind a contract Liitered into on fraudulent
representations, he must return or offer to return the property acquired
by such contract, within a reasonable time, and in such way as to place
the property and the vendor substantially in the same condition as at
the time the property was received : .JXanahan v. Noyes, 52 N. 1.
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In case of fraud by the vendor in a sale of real estate, whether a notice
by the vendee in possession, of a refusal to retain and pay for the pro.
perty, given to the vendor four days after the completion of the contract,
was a reasonable time, within the rule relating to the rescission of con-
tracts, is a question of fact and not of law : Id.
Assumpsit for money had and received will lie where a contract is
rescinded, to recover the money paid under it : Id.
Where A. gave to B. a five hundred dollar bill in order that B. might
change it and pay three hundred dollars of it to C., if the authority of
B. to pay such sum to 0. was countermanded by A. before payment:
Hdd, that all the money remained the property of A., who was entitled
to recover it of B. in an action of assumpsit for money had and received:
Td.
WAY.
Deed-se of Passage -Pescription-Costs.-The owner of two
adjoining lots, Nos. 5 and 6, fronting on M street, the southerly of
which-No. 5-was bounded on the south by C street, in 1833 con-
veyed No. 6, "with right of passage-way from C street to the rear of
the store,'-there being at that time a store on No. 6, extending back
45 feet from DI street. From 1833 to 1860, some 20 feet at the rear
end of No. 5 was vacant; and there was evidence tending to show that
during that period the occupants of No. 6 used a passage-way across
No. 5 from C street to the rear of their store on a particular line. In
1860, the defendant, being the owner of No. 6, extended his building
on that lot to the rear, so as to obstruct the passage where it had been
so used, but still left a passage-way 121 feet wide at the rear of the lot,
which the jury found to be reasonably suitable, convenient, sufficient
and necessary for the purposes for which a right of passage was granted
from 0 street to the place where the rear of the store was in 1833:
Held, that the call of the deed was answered by any passage-way from
C street to the rear of the store as it was in 1833, such as would be
reasonably convenient and suitable for the purposes for which it was
originally granted : Held, also, that as the use was substantially in ac-
cordance with the terms of the grant, it must be deemed to have been
under the grant and not adverse; and that no prescriptive right was
thereby gained: Smith v. iMggin, 52 N. H.
The main controversy related to the obstruction of the way. The
writ contained one count for an independent injury alleged to result
from the defendant's overhanging eaves, to which there was a confess-
ion. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff as to the eaves, but
on the other counts the verdict was for the defendant. It was ordered
that each party recover costs on the issues found in his favor: Id.
WILL.
Undue Influence-Wife.-An influence in procuring the execution of
a will, which when exercised by a wife may be lawful and proper, may
be illegitimate and undue when exercised by a woman living in unlaw.
ful intercourse with the testator : Kessinger et al. v. Kessinger et al., 37
Ind.
